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In this paper we build a formal model to study market environments where information is 
costly to acquire and is of use also to potential competitors. In such situations a market for 
information may form, where reports - of unverifiable quality - over the information acquired 
are sold. A complete characterization of the equilibria of the game is provided. We find that 
information is acquired when its costs are not too high and in that case it is also sold, though 
reports are typically noisy. Also, the market for information tends to be a monopoly, and there 
is typically inefficiency given by underinvestment in information acquisition. Regulatory 
interventions in the form of firewalls, limiting the access to the sale of information to third 
parties, uninterested in trading the underlying object, only make the inefficiency worse. On 
the other hand, efficiency can be attained with a monopolist selling differentiated information, 
provided entry is blocked. The above findings hold when information has a prevalent 
horizontal differentiation component. When that is not the case, and the vertical 
differentiation element is more important, firewalls can in fact be beneficial. 
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Motivation and Objectives It is common to observe potential competitors in a market
exchanging information about issues pertaining to that market. For example, one can see
ﬁnancial analysts providing news over market events, or soccer coaches pondering publicly
on the special abilities of (theirs or others’) team players. Similar situations arise in the
housing market, where we ﬁnd agents searching and then supplying information over hous-
ing properties on sale in the market; in the labor market, where managers often discuss the
characteristics of employees in their sector. This is somewhat surprising since the informa-
tion supplied often has a rival nature. As an example of this rivalry, taken from the private
equity market, the following quote from The Economist is illuminating: “Buy-out ﬁrms com-
plained that banks which were supposedly advising or lending to them sometimes snatched
deals from under their noses. A notorious example was the battle for Warner Chilcott, a
British drugmaker, in late 2004: while working with buy-out ﬁrms bidding for the company,
Credit Suisse teamed up with JPMorgan Chase to launch a bid of its own.”1 This reveals a
fundamental conﬂict arising in information markets. The ﬁnancial analyst mentioned above
may prefer to be the ﬁrst to use the discovery of an important event, and the soccer coach
could be a potential competitor in a bidding war for a particular player. As a consequence,
the provider of information may not be trusted to make truthful reports over the information
he acquired: the analyst can say that his sources indicate that clinical trials for the wonder
drug are going well, when in fact they are ﬂunking.
There is, in fact, a serious concern by regulators about the objectivity and the conﬂicts
of interest faced by ﬁnancial analysts.2 This concern is specially important when analysts
are not independent, but employed by brokers, who are interested in trading the underlying
stocks, as in the case of sell-side analysts, or even by the companies object of study, as in
the case of fee-based analysts. Title V of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for example, is entirely
devoted to “Analysts conﬂicts of interest.”3
1The Economist, October 12, 2006: “Banks and buy-outs: Follow the money”.
2Not only regulators, of course. The Economist (July 27, 2007) entitles an article “Analyst for sale.
Price: membership of a good club”, reporting on an unpublished (even as a working paper) study by James
Westphal and Michael Clement in which they survey thousands of analysts and executives. “Almost two-
thirds of the analysts admitted to receiving favors from the ﬁrms they cover. And those favors appeared to
sway their recommendations to their clients... If a company suﬀers subpar proﬁts, doing a good turn for an
analyst cuts the likelihood of a downgrade by half. In the wake of a big acquisition, which analysts tend to
frown on, the likelihood falls by 65%.”
3See also the recent report of the Forum Group (2003) created by the European Commission to deal with
1To further understand this problem notice ﬁrst that in many situations information may
be quite costly to acquire. Getting to know that the clinical trial of a particularly promising
drug are going well (and thus the stock price of the company doing the research) may
require nontrivial eﬀort for the analyst. Similarly, ﬁnding out that a young left-footed striker
currently playing in a second division Argentinian team is likely to be a star also requires
time and money. These costs, together with the fact that information is of common interest,
generate a clear incentive for generating a market for information, where the agents who
acquired information can provide reports over it, possibly in exchange for the payment of a
price, to other agents.
At the same time, the mere existence of information transmission may seem surprising,
given the rivalry in its use that we posit. Why would an analyst part with the information
about a company rather than make the maximal proﬁt through trading with it? As we will
see, this may happen more easily if diﬀerent individuals have diﬀerent values for the same
bit of information, or if some speciﬁc skills or features are needed to proﬁt from a given
news. The analyst who ﬁnds out about a pharmaceutical company may be specialized in
bond-trading, whereas the person with whom he shares the information may be interested
in precisely such kind of ﬁrms. In the language of industrial organization, we will see that
information about a horizontal dimension, instead of a vertical one, is particularly amenable
to proﬁtable exchanges. The possibility of exchanging, or selling information to other traders
may in turn aﬀect the agents’ incentive to acquire information.
The purpose of this paper is to present a model where we can analyze information acqui-
sition and transmission in an environment where the veracity of this information is neither
veriﬁable nor contractible. We are interested in examining when information is acquired;
if so, whether a market for information forms, and if it does how it is organized. That is,
who and how many traders sell information, who and how many traders buy it, hence how
competitive is the market, and how truthful is the information transmitted. But also what
are the eﬀects of the information that is transmitted for the performance of the underlying
market.
It is also important to ﬁnd the equilibrium payoﬀs of the various traders, as this will allow
us to evaluate the eﬃciency properties of equilibria, both the ex-post allocative eﬃciency of
the underlying markets (whether the objects traded end up in the hands of those who value
them most), as well as the eﬃciency of information acquisition. This will allow us to see
whether there is scope for regulatory restrictions to improve welfare. In the wake of recent
this problem.
2scandals in ﬁnancial markets, the regulatory bodies of many countries have strengthened the
requirements on information dissemination in various markets. One typical recommendation
has been to separate who provides information on a market from who trades in it (“ﬁrewalls”).
For example, section 501, title V in the Sarbanes-Oxley act orders ﬁnancial ﬁrms to establish
very speciﬁc safeguards to ensure the independence of analysts from traders. Essentially the
compensation of analysts should be independent from trading and information ﬂows between
the diﬀerent arms are severely restricted. It also orders these ﬁrms to disclose conﬂicts of
interest.4 It is then particularly of interest to investigate the welfare implication of such
restrictions.
The model and results We consider a market where a single, indivisible unit of an object
is up for sale. The market is organized as a (second price) auction, where several potential
buyers can participate. The good comes in diﬀerent possible varieties, and each buyer only
likes one randomly chosen variety. In addition to buyers, there is the seller, who initially owns
the object and has no utility for it, and some other agents who are not interested in trading
the object. The true variety is not known ex-ante by anybody, but can be ascertained,
incurring a given cost, by any market participant. Besides the market for the commodity
there is another market where information is traded: any agent who acquired information
can set a price at which he sells a report over his information to other potential buyers. The
information transmitted, as we said, is non veriﬁable, thus reports are pure “cheap talk”
messages.
We provide a complete characterization of the equilibria of such game. We ﬁnd that,
when information costs are not too high, information is acquired in equilibrium and in that
case it is also sold. That is, the market for information is active. However, the information
sold in that market can be noisy: when the provider of information is the seller of the
commodity, he tends to hype the value of the good he declares for the agents who purchase
information, while when he is a potential buyer, he tends to depress it.
Typically, only one trader acquires information in equilibrium, hence the market for
information is a monopoly. Information is either sold at a positive price such that all the
uninformed buyers except one purchase it or, when the cost of acquisition of information is
low, at a zero price so that all uninformed buyers purchase it. To understand this, notice
4The Global Settlement reached on April 28, 2003 between the SEC, the NASD, the NY State Attorney
General and NYSE also points in the same direction. Similarly in the report of the European Commission
Forum Group (2003), we read: “Analysts’ ﬁrms should have in place systems and controls to identify and
avoid, prevent or manage personal and corporate conﬂicts of interest.”
3that the seller of information may beneﬁt even by transmitting information for free as this
allows him to manipulate the behavior of uninformed traders in the auction and hence to
increase the amount of surplus he can appropriate in the auction.
We also show that, if information is acquired at all, the commodity is allocated eﬃciently
in the auction, i.e. to the agent who values it most. But the level of investment in information
acquisition is not eﬃcient, in particular there is typically underinvestment. Interestingly,
this ineﬃciency is present no matter what is the identity of the agent acquiring and selling
information, i.e. not only when he is a potential buyer or the seller, but also when he is
an agent not interested in trading the object. Actually, in the last case the ineﬃciency is
even more severe. Hence restricting the access to the market for the sale of information only
to disinterested traders (as in the case of “ﬁrewalls”), while improving the truthfulness of
the information transmitted, makes the overall market outcome worse. The reason is that
when the seller of information is also interested in trading the object, he has an additional
beneﬁt from the information, due to the possibility of trading directly on it. Hence the
investment in information is higher. In this respect, it is interesting to note that Boni (2005)
and Kolasinsky (2006) document signiﬁcant decreases in the number of analysts following
stocks after the Global Settlement5 and the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.6
An eﬃcient outcome can be attained if the informed agent can sell diﬀerent types of
reports, of diﬀerent quality, (or equivalently if we permit the resale of information). We show
that in this way the information provider, when he is a potential buyer, can appropriate all
the increase in social surplus generated by his information acquisition and dissemination. At
the same time, in this case entry in the market for information often becomes proﬁtable. Thus
some regulatory intervention may still be needed to have eﬃciency, protecting monopoly
situations in the market for information with barriers to entry, though regulators usually
frown upon such practices.7
In most of the paper we consider the case we described where the uncertainty concerns
the true ”variety” of the object up for sale, over which buyers have diﬀerent preferences. We
can thus say, as mentioned above, that information only concerns a horizontal diﬀerentiation
element. At the end of the paper we consider the case where an element of vertical diﬀeren-
5See footnote 4.
6There is not a clear consensus as to the reasons for this drop (see Parker 2005, Kolasinsky 2006, Zingales
2006). Since that discussion is mostly atheoretical, we believe that our model can shed some light on the
mechanisms which underlie this empirical observation.
7It even landed a jail sentence to Henry Blodget, the noted Merril Lynch analyst who was issuing an
“accumulate” recommendation for Excite at Home while in an internal e-mail he was writing “ATHM is
such a piece of crap!”
4tiation is introduced: the commodity can now also be of high and low quality, and all buyers
prefer, at least weakly, high to low quality. In that case, the degree of truthfulness of the
reports transmitted deteriorates, both when the provider is a potential buyer or when he is
the seller of the commodity. Hence, if quality is suﬃciently important for buyers, ﬁrewalls
could be welfare improving. The conclusion that emerges is that ﬁrewalls are beneﬁcial only
in some situations, as the one above, and may thus be imposed with care.
The paper is organized as follows. The environment is described in Section 2 while a
complete characterization of the properties of the equilibria and their welfare properties
when information providers are potential buyers is given in Section 3. The following Section
investigates how the properties of equilibria, in particular their eﬃciency, vary with other
types of providers of information, establishing the adverse eﬀect on welfare of ﬁrewalls.
Section 5 presents some alternative ways in which the ineﬃciency problem can be solved.
The robustness of our results and some extensions are then discussed in Section 6.
Literature This paper is related to diﬀerent strands in the literature. More obviously, it
is related to the seminal work of Crawford and Sobel (1982) on strategic information trans-
mission. The primary focus of such work and the ensuing literature is the message game
and the relationship between information transmission and alignment of the preferences of
sender and receiver (or the ‘conﬂict of interest’ among them). To that literature, we add a
richer game structure. The amount of information available and who ’owns’ it are endoge-
nously determined, as a result of the information acquisition decisions of every agent. We
also allow messages to be transmitted for the payment of a price, thus formalizing a market
for information. And we examine the consequences of the acquisition and transmission of
information for the properties of the equilibria in the underlying market for the commodity.
Finally, with regard to the message (sub)game, in our set-up the degree of coincidence of the
objectives of sender and receivers is not common knowledge, as it depends on the realization
of the true variety of the object and of the preferred variety of each potential buyer, which
is only privately known to him.
There is also a rather large empirical literature which studies the behavior of ﬁnancial
analysts, and in particular the presence of biases in their reports, and its eﬀects for the
performance of asset markets; e.g., Womack (1996), Michaely and Womack (1999), Barber
et al. (2001), Agrawal and Chen (2006), Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2003), Jegadeesh
et al. (2004), and the recent survey by Mehran and Stulz (2007).
On the other hand there is much less theoretical work on markets for information. A good
part of the attention has received the case where the quality of the information transmitted
5is perfectly veriﬁable, thus abstracting from the problem of untruthful reports, as well as
from the problem of information acquisition. Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1986, 1990) look at
a situation where market participants act as price takers, where the “paradox” arises that
when information is too precise, asset prices are perfectly revealing, so that information is
worthless. Therefore, providers need to add some noise in order to proﬁt from information
sales.8 When traders are strategic, information transmission may also provide a strategic
advantage, as pointed out by Vives (1990) in a general oligopoly framework, and Fishman
and Hagerty (1995) in the case of ﬁnancial markets.
The case where the information transmitted is non veriﬁable, as in our set-up, has been
considered by Morgan and Stocken (2003), who study the information transmitted by an
analyst when his incentives may not be aligned with those of investors, as he may be either
a type that enjoys higher utility when the price of the underlying asset is high, or a type
that enjoys telling the truth. They ﬁnd that the analyst always “hypes” the stock; see also
Kartik, Ottaviani and Squintani (2007). This is in line with our results for the case in which
the information provider is the seller of the object. Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2007) study
how a cost for lying and competition can mitigate the tendency of ﬁnancial intermediaries
to sell to their costumers products that are not appropriate for their tastes. They share
with our work the feature that the information transmitted has a horizontal dimension, but
they focus on the incentives for truth-telling by sellers who may sometimes carry all existing
varieties and some other times only one.
Our analysis, being cast in a static framework, abstracts from reputational concerns.
These may arise in a dynamic framework, where providers of information and traders re-
peatedly interact, and may mitigate the tendency of providers to send untruthful reports
which may damage their future reputation, as shown by Benabou and Laroque (1992), and
Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006).
2 Model
There is one object for sale, initially owned by an agent, indicated as the seller of the object,
who has no utility for it. The type of the object is uncertain: there are K possible varieties,
all with the same ex-ante probability. Let the true type of the object be v ∈ K = {1,2,...,K}.
There are then N potential buyers, agents who may be interested in purchasing the object.
8A similar point is made in Milgrom (1981) who explores how to inform others, if providing too good
information can hurt the provider.
6We denote buyer i ∈ N ={1,...,N} by Bi; such buyer only cares (has positive utility) for
one particular variety in K indicated as θi. The variables {θi}i∈N and v are all i.i.d. over K,
thus for all i,j ∈ N, θi is uncorrelated with θj and v; all elements of K have then the same
probability, 1/K. The object is allocated to buyers via a second price auction.
Information structure. The realization of θi is private information of individual i. On
the other hand, the type of the object for sale is not known to any trader. Before the auction
takes place, anybody can acquire, by paying a cost c, a signal over the type of the object,
which we assume is perfectly informative. If a trader acquires such signal he can in turn
‘sell information’ to other traders.
The utility of buyer Bi can then be written as
πBi = Iv − cIe − tBi,
where tBi is the sum of the net monetary payments made by Bi to the seller to gain possession
of the object and/or to the other traders to purchase or sell information to them. Iv is an
indicator variable that takes the value 1 if Bi gains the object and v = θi (i.e., the object is
of the type Bi likes) and 0 otherwise. Finally Ie is another indicator that takes the value 1
if Bi decides to acquire the signal over the type of the object, and 0 otherwise.
In this paper we are interested in situations where the information sold is not veriﬁable,
i.e. the seller of information sends a report, which is pure ‘cheap talk’, over the signal he
received. Since we abstract from reputational concerns (there is a single period), information
is transmitted only when the seller cannot proﬁt by distorting his report. This in turn requires
us to examine the consequences of transmitting false or truthful information for the behavior
of buyers in the market for the good. In the environment described, diﬀerent buyers might,
but also might not, be interested in the same type of object, the uncertainty only concerns
a horizontal diﬀerentiation component of the object. Hence the information transmitted,
while being rival, has also an element of non-rivalry. One could interpret the speciﬁcation of
the model as capturing situations where the agent who sells information is not always able
to proﬁt directly from the information acquired. For example, leveraging the information
may require the possession of complementary assets or skills, which he may lack. In section
6 we extend the model to allow also for the presence of a vertical diﬀerentiation component.
We examine ﬁrst the case where information can be acquired and transmitted by potential
buyers of the object. The possibility that information is sold by other traders, as the seller of
the object and/or agents not interested in trading the object, is considered later, in section
74. Furthermore, we assume that each seller of information sells a single, identical report to
all buyers, at the same price; we refer to this situation as no diﬀerentiation of the quality
of the information sold. In section 5.1 we discuss the case where diﬀerent kinds of reports
may be sold by the same trader, at diﬀerent prices.
Timing of the game.
1. First, each potential buyer decides whether or not to acquire the signal over the type
of the object. The cost of the signal is c. The decision to acquire information, but
obviously not the information itself, is commonly observable by all agents.
2. Any potential buyer who has chosen to acquire information, before learning the re-
alization of the (perfectly informative) signal over the type of the object, can post a
price p at which he is willing to sell a report over the signal, which will be sent after
receiving it.9
3. Each of the buyers who did not choose to acquire information in stage 1. decides
whether or not to purchase information from any of the traders selling information
(possibly from more than one seller). Each of these buyers has then a ﬁnal chance,
after the market for information closes, to acquire the signal at a cost of c.10
4. All agents who paid the cost c of information acquisition learn the realization of the
signal. They then issue a report to the buyers who purchased information from them.
5. A second price auction takes place among all the buyers for allocating the object.
Message subgame. We consider the case where the set of messages available to a seller
of information is the set of direct messages:
M = {1,2,...,K},
9Thus the price posted has no signaling content. In section 6 we discuss the eﬀects of considering the
case where the price is posted only after learning the realization of the signal, as well as alternative auction
formats, and other robustness checks.
10This last opportunity of direct information acquisition, with no opportunity to resell it, limits the ability
of the sellers of information to corner the market and extract surplus from buyers. The timing reﬂects the
fact that acquiring information entails a simpler technology and takes less time than organizing a market
for selling reports over it.
8i.e. it coincides with the set K of possible types of the object. The report sent by the seller
is then given by one of the K possible types of the object. Moreover, the message structure
is augmented so as to involve two phases:
a. Each uninformed buyer who has agreed to purchase information sends ﬁrst a report
over his type to the trader selling information (the set of available messages for an
uninformed buyer Bi is again the set of possible types of the buyer, given by K). Such
report is observed only by the seller of information, not by the other buyers.
b. Subsequently, the seller of information sends a report over what he learned to all the
buyers who purchased information from him.
It will be clear from the analysis in the next Section that the presence of the ﬁrst phase,
by providing the seller of information with some information over buyers’ preferences, allows
to enhance his revenue and, furthermore, that there is no essential loss of generality in
restricting attention to direct messages.11
We will assume that the number of buyers is not ’too small’ - in particular that N is
at least larger than 3 - so as to avoid the trivial case where there is no competition among
buyers. In addition, we consider the case where the number K of possible types of the object
is strictly greater than the number N of potential buyers:
K > N,
so that the competition among buyers for the object, while always present, is not very
intense.12
3 Equilibrium and welfare
3.1 Equilibrium
Since information transmission needs not be truthful, the game (and in particular the message
subgame, starting from stage 4 of the game) has many equilibria, as is common in other
kinds of “cheap talk” games (see Crawford and Sobel 1982). We focus our attention on the
11We will show in particular that our analysis and results extend to the case where the set of messages is
expanded to include the possibility of sending no report.
12The only role of this condition is to simplify the presentation. As argued in footnote 14, our results
remain valid when K ≤ N.
9equilibria where the degree of truthfulness in agents’ reporting - and hence the revenue of
the seller of information - is maximal.
We will show that an equilibrium always exists where uninformed buyers truthfully report
their type to the seller of information and this one adopts the following reporting strategy










for all y  = θj ∀Bj ∈ N(Bi),
if v = θi
(1)
where Bi denotes the buyer selling information, mi is the report issued by him, N(Bi) the set
given by all the buyers purchasing information from Bi, and N(Bi) the number of distinct
realizations of θj across all buyers Bj ∈ N(Bi). Therefore, trader Bi tells the truth about
the type of the object when the true variety of the object does not coincide with his own
type (i.e. with the variety he likes). On the other hand, when the two coincide Bi faces a
conﬂict of interest as he wishes to get the good at the lowest possible price, and this price
generally depends on the report sent by him. Thus, he will not tell the truth and will send a
message which is a randomization over all the types which are diﬀerent from the type of all
the agents buying information from him.13 One could interpret this message as telling the
buyers of information that the object is not appropriate for any of them.14
It should be clear, also from the following analysis, that the reporting strategy described
in (1) entails the maximal degree of information transmission at an equilibrium. Since there
is no cost for lying, the seller is only willing to tell the truth when he cannot gain a strictly
higher payoﬀ in the market (i.e. in the auction) by lying and this happens when he is
not interested in the object. If the seller’s reports are informative and hence aﬀect buyers’
beliefs and bids, we should expect a buyer, upon receipt of a report saying that he likes the
object, to raise the belief that he indeed likes the object and hence his bid, and decrease
them otherwise. Hence when the seller is interested in getting the object he wants to deceive
buyers and send a report (as the one above) telling them they do not like the object, which
13Strictly speaking, when the seller likes the object but no buyer of information likes it, the seller might
still tell the truth (as in this case it would have no negative eﬀect for him).
14When K ≤ N the set of available messages given by M is clearly not rich enough to obtain this outcome.
However, this could be achieved by enlarging the set of possible messages to allow for the possibility that a
separate message is sent to each buyer of information, telling him whether or not he likes the object. With
this extension, the properties of the equilibrium outcome found in the next section remain valid also when
K ≤ N.
10induces them to lower their bids and hence the price at which the object is gained by the
seller of information
An additional source of multiplicity of equilibria comes from traders’ behavior in the
auction, in the ﬁnal stage of the game. We show that there is always an equilibrium of the
auction where the bid of each trader equals his expected value of the object, conditional on
winning the auction, and focus our attention on such equilibrium (’with truthful bidding’).
Other equilibria may exist, but are typically non robust to trembles and we will ignore them
in what follows.
We will characterize the perfect bayesian equilibria of the game described in the previ-
ous section and evaluate their welfare properties for diﬀerent parameter conﬁgurations (in
particular, for diﬀerent levels of the cost of information acquisition, c). Given the selection
of equilibria in the message and auction subgames speciﬁed above (quite natural, we would
like to argue, given our purposes), we will show that the overall equilibrium is, for almost
all parameter values, unique:
Theorem 1 For all c ≥ 0 there exists a perfect bayesian equilibrium of the game with
no diﬀerentiation of the quality of information sold where sellers of information adopt the
reporting strategy in (1), buyers of information truthfully report their type to sellers, and
participants in the auction adopt a truthful bidding strategy. Furthermore:











 N−1 , no buyer chooses to acquire information;
the object is then gained by a randomly chosen buyer, at a price 1/K.






, one buyer acquires information and sells a report over it at









, at which all the other buyers except one purchase
information; the object is then always gained by a buyer who likes it, if such a buyer
exists, at a price equal to 1/K (when either the seller of information, or only one buyer
of information likes the object), 0 (when neither the seller nor any buyer of information
likes the object) and 1 otherwise.
3. If c0 ≥ c, one buyer acquires information and sells a report over it at a price p = 0, at
which all the other buyers purchase it; the object is then always gained by a buyer who
likes it, if such a buyer exists, at a price equal to 0 (when the seller of information, or
exactly one of the other buyers, who all purchase information, likes the object), and 1
otherwise.
11p = 0 p >  0





Figure 1: Equilibrium with homogeneous messages
This is the unique equilibrium outcome with reporting strategies exhibiting maximal de-
gree of truthfulness and truthful bidding strategies for all possible values of c, with the only





 N−1 ≥ c ≥ c0, where another
equilibrium exists, with two buyers acquiring information and each of them selling a report
over it to all other buyers, at a price p = 0; the object is then always gained by a buyer who
likes it, if such a buyer exists, at a price of 0 if nobody else likes it, and 1 otherwise.
Thus when information costs are low enough, information is acquired in equilibrium.
Whenever it is acquired, information is transmitted via a report that in some events is
truthful while in others is a lie. Information is sold for a low enough price so that all buyers,
or all buyers except one, purchase it. The market for information is typically a monopoly.
Furthermore, the seller of information always gets the object when he likes it; when he does
not like it, the object goes to one of the buyers of information who likes it, if such buyer
exists and otherwise, in case 2. goes to the buyer not purchasing information, while in case
3. goes to a random buyer who purchased information. Figure 1 summarizes the result.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 1
We present here the main steps of the proof of the Theorem while leaving some details in
the Appendix. First, the consistent beliefs of buyers associated with the sellers’ reporting
strategy in equation (1) are determined. Then we study the traders’ strategies in each stage
of the game, and establish their optimality given the beliefs.
Beliefs With the message structure in (1) there are no out-of-equilibrium messages. Thus,
we can ﬁnd the beliefs for an uninformed buyer, say buyer Bj, who receives a report from
12an informed buyer, say buyer Bi, using Bayes’ rule in all cases:
- When buyer Bj receives from Bi a message mi = θj he knows for sure that he likes the
object (the message is truthful). That is, Pr(v = θj|mi = θj) = 1.
- When buyer Bj receives a message diﬀerent from his type, this may happen for two reasons:
either the message is truthful, and then Bj does not like the object, or it is not truthful,
as the sender likes the object and is randomizing over types diﬀerent from his own and
the types of buyers of information. In this case there is then a positive probability that
Bj may like the object.
Finally, the buyers who neither acquired information directly, nor indirectly by purchasing
it in the market, have beliefs equal to their prior beliefs. That is, Pr(v = θj) = 1/K. The
beliefs of a buyer who is purchasing two (or more) distinct reports from two (or more)
informed buyers are similar.
Stage 5: Behavior in the auction
Given the beliefs of buyers who purchased one report we can show that a ‘truthful bidding
strategy’ - where a trader’s bid equals his expected value of the object, conditional on winning
the auction - is always optimal if all other traders adopt such strategy:
- When a buyer receives a message indicating that the object is of the type he likes, his
belief - as argued above - is that with probability 1 he likes the object. His optimal
bid when the other bidders adopt ’truthful bidding strategies’ is equal to 1, i.e. to his
posterior beliefs about the valuation of the object, and is then also truthful.
- A message diﬀerent from the type a buyer likes is received as we said in two alternative
events. The ﬁrst one is when the buyer likes the object, but so does the sender of the
message. In that case the buyer cannot win the object in the auction with a positive
surplus, i.e. at a price lower than his valuation. This is because the seller of information
is better informed and, if he adopts a truthful bidding strategy, will make a higher bid,
equal to 1. The other possibility is that the buyer does not like the object, in which
case any positive bid, if successful, would yield him a negative surplus (with positive
probability). Thus any positive bid yields a negative expected payoﬀ. The optimal
bid of a buyer of information, after receiving a message diﬀerent from his type, is then
equal to zero, which is his expected value of the object conditional on winning the
auction; so in this case too it is a truthful bidding strategy.
13Notice that, even though we are in a second price auction the buyer’s bid is not always
equal to his posterior belief over the value of the object. This is due to the correlation of the
information of traders induced by the sender’s reporting strategy. The information conveyed
by winning the auction should then also be taken into account.
In contrast, the buyers who do not purchase any information do not suﬀer from a correla-
tion problem (there is no relevant information for them in the event of winning the auction).
Thus, the optimal bid in their case is: Pr(v = θj) = 1/K.
How important is the restriction to ’truthful bidding strategies’? We claim such restric-
tion only bites when there is a single trader who is not acquiring information nor purchasing
it from other buyers, i.e. who chooses to remain uninformed. In this case any strictly
positive bid lower than 1/K by the uninformed buyer gives him the same payoﬀ as a bid
of 1/K; this may in turn aﬀect the other traders’ optimal bidding strategies and generate
other equilibria. On the other hand, when more than one trader remains uninformed, or all
traders purchase information, the only equilibrium in the auction subgame is the one with
truthful bidding strategies. We can argue therefore that the equilibria where not all bidders
follow a truthful bidding strategy, if they exist, are non robust to trembles concerning the
decision of purchasing information.
The bidding behavior of an uninformed buyer receiving more than one report from dif-
ferent informed buyers is analogous to the one described above. When his posterior belief
over the value of the object equals one, he will bid one, and will bid zero otherwise (when
the messages received are not fully informative).
Stage 4: Behavior in the message subgame
We show ﬁrst that the reporting strategy we postulated for a seller of information is
indeed optimal for such trader. We then verify that each buyer of information is willing to
report truthfully his type to the seller of information. A key element in the argument is
that, by changing the message strategy, neither the seller nor any buyer of information can
aﬀect the outcome of the auction in his favor.
Seller: There are two possible deviations which need to be considered for the seller of infor-
mation. When he likes the object, he may deviate and announce a type corresponding
to one of the traders purchasing information from him. If he does that, the bid of that
trader will be higher and equal to 1, and the seller will end up paying more for the
object than if he had followed the equilibrium message strategy, so he never wants to
make such deviation. Second, when the seller does not like the object, he may deviate
14by announcing a type diﬀerent from the true one. But that only changes the outcome
in the auction, which has no eﬀect on the seller’s utility in this case since he is not
interested in the object. So the seller does not gain with such a deviation either.
Buyer: A deviation by a buyer of information consists in reporting something diﬀerent
from his true type. This has no consequence when the seller of information does not
like the object, because in that case the seller reports the truth, no matter what are
the reports he receives from the buyers of information. On the other hand, when the
seller of information likes the object a buyer’s lie may change the seller’s report; in
particular, it may induce the seller to announce the buyer’s type (both when this is
equal and when it diﬀers from the true type of the object). However, in this second case
the seller of information always bids 1, hence the buyer still cannot gain any surplus.
It thus follows that the buyer of information cannot gain, and may actually lose, by
misreporting his type.
Stage 3: Purchase of information.
In this stage each uninformed buyer has to choose whether to purchase information from
one - or more - of the informed buyers who are selling information, at the price posted by
them, or alternatively to acquire the information directly (at the cost c), or do nothing of
the two.
Stage 2: Sale of information.
This is the key stage of the game, where the market for information opens and each
trader who at stage 1 has chosen to acquire information posts a price at which he is willing
to sell a report over it to any other buyer. The price is set at the level which maximizes the
utility of the seller of information, i.e. his expected payoﬀ in the auction plus the revenue
from the sale of information, taking as given the strategies of the other sellers, if any, and
the response strategies of buyers in the next stage to the prices posted. The main elements
of the analysis are summarized below.
The maximal willingness to pay for information of an uninformed buyer is given by
the amount by which the buyer’s payoﬀ in the auction increases if he purchases information
and hence becomes indirectly informed, relative to the best of his two alternatives: acquire
information directly at the cost c, or remain uninformed. The expected payoﬀ in the auction
of the buyer of information is in turn determined by the probability that he gains the object
with a positive surplus, which occurs when he likes it and no other trader who is directly
15or indirectly informed likes it, and the price at which the object is gained. Letting J be
the total number of buyers who did not acquire information, either directly or indirectly,
the probability of this event is 1/K [(K − 1)/K]
N−J−1, and is clearly higher the lower is the
number of agents who are purchasing information. The price paid to win the object in the
auction in this event, given the bidding strategies described in the previous steps, is 0 if
J = 0, i.e. if no buyer remains uninformed, and 1/K otherwise.
If an uninformed buyer were not to purchase information but to acquire it directly in the
next stage of the game, his payoﬀ in the auction would be exactly the same, minus the cost
c. This implies that, for the sale of information to take place, its price p cannot be higher
than c.15 On the other hand, if the buyer remains uninformed his payoﬀ is zero if there are
other uninformed buyers, while if he is the only uninformed trader it is positive and equal
to 1/K [(K − 1)/K]
N−1 . By comparing this expression with the ones obtained above and in
the previous paragraph, it is immediate to see that a buyer is only willing to pay a positive
price for information when not all the other buyers are either directly or indirectly informed











which is strictly decreasing in N −J. Thus the demand for information is strictly decreasing
in its price p, for p < c.
When there is a monopolist seller of information, he always sets the price so as
to extract all the surplus from the number of buyers he wishes to attract, i.e. equal to
their maximal willingness to pay. The issue is then to determine the number of buyers of
information which maximizes the seller’s payoﬀ. In the Appendix, we show the following:
Claim 1 The revenue from the sale of information for a monopolist seller of infor-
mation is maximized by setting the price p low enough that all uninformed buyers, except
one, purchase information, i.e. such that J = 1.
The second component in the payoﬀ of the seller of information is given by his payoﬀ
in the auction. Given the reporting and bidding strategies described above, the sale of
information has no inﬂuence on the fact that a monopolist seller always gains the object
whenever he likes it. Hence its only possible consequence is on the price at which the seller
gains the object in the auction, via its eﬀect on buyers’ bids. As argued above, when the
15Also, if p < c no buyer chooses to acquire information directly in stage 3 of the game.
16seller sets the price of information low enough - at zero in fact - that all uninformed buyers
purchase information (J = 0), he gains the object at a zero price, otherwise he has to pay
1/K to get the object (the same as with no sale of information).
This leads us to the crucial tradeoﬀ faced by the monopolist seller. He has in fact
to choose between the price which maximizes his revenue from the sale of information (and
induces all uninformed buyers except one to purchase information) and the lower (zero as
we said) price which maximizes his payoﬀ in the auction, attracting all buyers. Then, as we
show in the Appendix:
Claim 2 When c < c0 the payoﬀ of the seller of information is maximal if he gives
away the information for free, i.e. sets p = 0, to guarantee that the auction price is low.
On the other hand, for c > c0 the price at which information can be sold is suﬃciently high
that the seller’s payoﬀ is maximal with p > 0 (J = 1).
With an information oligopoly, the equilibrium price of information is always zero.
Note ﬁrst that, when there are two or more sellers of information, the additional beneﬁt
for an uninformed buyer of purchasing a second report is always zero. This follows from
the fact that purchasing information from one seller allows to gain a positive surplus in
the auction only when the buyer likes the object and nobody else who is informed, either
directly or indirectly, likes the object. Purchasing information also from a second seller
allows the buyer to have more precise information in the event in which one of the two
sellers of information likes the object (since the other tells the truth); however in such event
no positive surplus can be gained since the seller who likes the object bids one.
Furthermore, the beneﬁt for a buyer of purchasing one report is essentially the same as
when there is a monopolist seller; in particular, it is positive only if not all the other buyers
purchase information, i.e. buy at least one report. Given that each buyer is willing to pay
a positive price only for one signal, and only if not all other buyers purchase information,
the only possible equilibrium with positive prices would entail a split of the buyers between
the diﬀerent providers of information, with at least one buyer not purchasing information.
But then each of the sellers would have an incentive to undercut. By lowering his price the
seller would retain all those already buying from him and manage to steal the buyers from
the other sellers of information. This produces a discrete jump not only in his revenue from
the sale of information but also in his payoﬀ in the auction; the latter is in fact positive
(and equal to 1 − 1/K if at least one trader is not purchasing information) when the seller
likes the object and neither the other sellers of information, nor any other buyer that is
17purchasing information from the other sellers, likes the object. Hence the probability that
a seller has a positive surplus increases with the number of buyers who purchase information
only from him. Since such incentive to undercut persists as long as the posted prices for
information are positive, the only possible equilibrium obtains when all sellers post a zero
price for information and all uninformed buyers purchase information from every seller. In
this situation, the sellers of information have the same payoﬀ as the buyers of information,
less the cost of acquiring information, thus their overall payoﬀ is lower.
Stage 1: Information acquisition
Having determined the beneﬁts for a buyer of acquiring information, we immediately ﬁnd
when this is proﬁtable:
Claim 3 When the cost of acquiring information is so high (c ≥ cI) that it exceeds the
maximal gains that a monopolist seller of information can get from the sale of informa-
tion ([(N − 2)/K][(K − 1)/K]N−1) plus the gains from obtaining the object in the auction
((1/K)[(K − 1)/K]), no buyer chooses to acquire information. On the other hand, when
c ≤ cI one buyer always acquires information.
As argued above in the discussion of Step 2, when a buyer acquires information he always
chooses to sell a report over it. Furthermore, the entry in the market for the sale of informa-
tion by a second buyer is never strictly proﬁtable, as the payoﬀ of an informed duopolist is
less or equal than the payoﬀ that trader would get if he did not acquire information directly
but rather purchase it from the other informed buyer. We show in the Appendix that
Claim 4 For a range of intermediate values of c, cD ≥ c ≥ c0,16 the payoﬀ is exactly equal
for an informed duopolist and a buyer of information with a monopolist seller of information.
In this case there are two equilibria, one with a monopolist seller of information and the
other with two sellers of information. Outside this range there is a unique equilibrium with
a monopolist seller.
3.3 Welfare
We now discuss the welfare properties of the equilibria described in the previous section. In
particular we are interested in comparing the equilibria to the Pareto eﬃcient allocations,
i.e. to the allocations which could be attained by a planner who (knows the buyers’ types
16For c in this interval, a monopolist seller sets the price of information at p = c.
18but) is also uninformed about the type of the object and may acquire information, at the
same cost c, over it. Given the assumed transferable property of traders’ utilities, welfare
can be simply evaluated by considering the total surplus, or the sum of the payoﬀs of all
buyers and the seller of the object.
Notice ﬁrst that, if information is acquired by some buyer, the resulting equilibrium al-
location is always ex post eﬃcient, in the sense that the object always goes to a buyer who
likes it the most. Hence the only possible source of ineﬃciency may lie in the information
acquisition decision: is that also eﬃcient at equilibrium, or rather is there overinvestment,
or underinvestment in information? Evidently, the equilibrium with two buyers both ac-
quiring information is always ineﬃcient as the duplication of the investment in information
acquisition is always wasteful. On the other hand, at an equilibrium where only one buyer
acquires information there is no wasteful duplication. Such equilibrium was shown to exist
for all c ≤ cI, while for c > cI no information is acquired.
To assess the eﬃciency of such equilibrium we need then to ﬁnd the threshold for informa-
tion to be acquired at an eﬃcient allocation and compare it to cI. If information is acquired,
the object can always be allocated to a buyer who likes it, when such buyer exists. In that
event the total surplus of traders from the object equals one, while it is zero otherwise. Total
welfare is then obtained by subtracting the cost of information:






On the other hand, if information is not acquired the total surplus is one only if the agent
who receives the object (and, with no information, this agent can only be randomly chosen)





By comparing W0 and W1 we ﬁnd that it is socially eﬃcient for information acquisition to
take place if, and only if, 1 − ((K − 1)/K)











We show in what follows that this threshold is lower than cI:
Proposition 1 In equilibrium there is a less than eﬃcient level of investment in informa-
tion. In particular, for values of c lying in the following, non empty interval:
c











19no information is acquired in equilibrium, though it would be socially eﬃcient to acquire it.17
Thus there is a range of values of c for which acquiring information is eﬃcient but in
equilibrium the gains from information acquisition are too low so that nobody chooses to
become informed. To understand the reasons for this result, it is useful to examine ﬁrst
the distribution of the welfare gains and losses across agents when we compare the situation
where no information is acquired to the equilibrium with a monopolist seller of information,
in particular when c is below but close to its threshold value cI.
Who gains and who loses from information acquisition When c ∈ [cI,c0] in equi-
librium there is one buyer, say B1, who acquires information directly and then sells it, as
a monopolist, and another buyer, say BN, who remains uninformed. B1 clearly gains, with
respect to the situation where no information is acquired, as his payoﬀ goes from 0 to a









is strictly positive. On the other hand, the payoﬀ of the remaining buyers, who acquire
information indirectly by purchasing a report in the market, is unchanged at zero when c is
smaller but close to cI.































As claimed in 2. of Theorem 1, the price at which the object is gained in the auction can
be 1, 1/K or 0. The terms in square brackets above are then the probabilities of the auction
price being, respectively, 1 and 1/K. The diﬀerence in the revenue of the seller of the object
between this case and the one where nobody is informed (where the price in the auction is































17The proof of this and the following propositions are in the Appendix.
18See equation (16) in the Appendix.
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As we show in section 4.2 below, this inequality is satisﬁed for some, but not all admissible
values of K and N.
The source of the ineﬃciency From the ex post eﬃciency of the equilibrium allocations
with a monopolist seller of information it follows that the sum of the changes in the payoﬀ
of all traders between the equilibrium with and without information acquisition equals the
diﬀerence between the levels of maximal total welfare in these two situations, W1 − W0.
The analysis of the distribution of the welfare changes across agents in the previous section
allows us so to gain some further understanding of the source of the ineﬃciency result we
obtained. Since, as we said, the payoﬀ of the indirectly informed buyers is zero in both
situations (when c is close to cI), the change in total welfare W1 − W0 equals the change in
the payoﬀ of the seller of the object ∆πS plus the payoﬀ of the buyer who acquires and sells
information and the payoﬀ of the buyer who remains uninformed:
W1 − W0 = ∆πS + πB1 + πBN. (7)
Underinvestment in information obtains if πBN + ∆πS > 0, i.e. if the trader acquiring
information is unable to recoup all the gains in social surplus generated by his decision.
From (4) and (5) we get:
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> 0,
(8)
which is strictly positive if and only if the interval of values of c deﬁned by (3) is non empty,
always true by Proposition 1. It is also useful to notice that the expression in (8) is equal
to the ﬁrst term of (5), describing the gains which accrue to the seller when at least two
indirectly informed buyers happen to like the object, so their bids raise to 1 the price at
which the object is won in the auction. We refer so to such term as rent dissipation by
indirectly informed buyers, since these are rents generated by the information acquisition
that the buyer who makes the investment in information will not appropriate, and go instead
to the seller of the good.
As argued in the previous section, the term πBN is strictly positive. Thus the uninformed
buyer appropriates some informational rents, by successfully free riding on the information
21acquisition of all the other buyers, which allows him to get the object at a zero price when
nobody else likes it. We indicate then this term as free riding. Note that it is exactly equal
to the second, negative, term in expression (5) for ∆πS, which reveals that the free riding
happens entirely at the expense of the seller of the object and entails so a pure transfer
of surplus from the seller to BN, and hence does not undermine the incentives for eﬃcient
information acquisition. What does undermine such incentives, and shows in equation (8),
is thus only the rent dissipation.
4 Who should sell information?
Does the ineﬃciency we found depend on the fact that information is sold by a trader who
is also interested in purchasing the object? We examine here the eﬃciency properties of
equilibria when other types of traders can be the providers of information.
4.1 Disinterested traders
As we said in the introduction, a common proposal for solving ineﬃciencies in information
transmission in markets is the separation between information providers and traders. We
model this by introducing a new type of agents, who do not own the object nor have any
utility for it and hence have no interest in participating in the market where the object is
traded. To keep the comparison clean, we assume that also this type of disinterested traders
has to pay a cost c to acquire the information.
The reporting strategy of a disinterested trader is clearly diﬀerent from that of an inter-
ested trader since the ﬁrst one never has an interest in lying over the type of the object. The
optimal reporting strategy with maximal degree of truthfulness for the disinterested trader
is then to always tell the truth. Hence the quality of the information transmitted is clearly
higher and so information can be sold at a higher price. Does this imply the equilibrium
with a disinterested trader as provider of information has better eﬃciency properties? We
will show that the answer to such question is negative, the eﬃciency properties are actually
worse in this case, as the incentives for information acquisition are weaker.
Proposition 2 When information can be sold only by disinterested traders, in equilibrium
there is again a less than eﬃcient level of investment in information. Furthermore, the
interval of values of c for which information is not acquired in equilibrium though it is



















which is larger than the one found in Proposition 1 when information is sold by potential
buyers.
The intuition for this result is not too hard to get. Notice ﬁrst that the payoﬀ of a
disinterested trader is only given by his revenue from the sale of information, as he never
gets any payoﬀ in the auction. Hence information is acquired in equilibrium if the revenue
from the sale of information alone exceeds the cost c. As a consequence, there can be an
equilibrium where information is sold by a disinterested trader only if he is the monopolist
provider of information and information is sold at a strictly positive price (with two or more
sellers of information, by the argument given in the previous section, the price of information
is always zero).
For the incentives to acquire information to be stronger in the present situation, the
higher revenue from the sale of better quality information should more than compensate
the lack of any payoﬀ in the auction. The disinterested trader has one additional customer
than a potential buyer as he can sell information at a positive price to N − 1 rather than
N − 2 buyers. Since, as shown in the proof, the price at which information is sold is the
same, this means an extra gain from the sale of information equal to 1/K [(K − 1)/K]
N−1.
On the other hand, a disinterested trader does not gain any surplus in the auction, so he
loses, with respect to a potential buyer, the surplus this one gets in the auction, which is
(K − 1)/(K)
2. Clearly, the loss is larger than the gain, which explains the greater region of
ineﬃciency for the disinterested trader.
4.2 The seller of the good
We examine next whether the owner of the good as a provider of information could allow to
overcome the ineﬃciency problem we found. We consider the case where the owner of the
good does not ask buyers to report their type. This is in fact the best for him, as we will
argue below. If the seller has no information over the buyers’ types, he is willing to report
truthfully the type of the object, like the uninterested trader; hence the information sold is
of the highest quality.
23Proposition 3 When only the owner of the good can be seller of information, in equilibrium
there is a less than eﬃcient level of investment in information. In particular, for values of





















information acquisition is socially eﬃcient, but does not take place in equilibrium.
This result can also be easily understood in the light of the discussion in section 3.3. Like
in the case where information is sold by a potential buyer of the good, whenever information
is acquired equilibrium allocations are always ex-post eﬃcient. Hence, the sum of the changes
in the payoﬀ of all traders between the situation with and without information acquisition
equals the change in total welfare, W1 − W0. Since the payoﬀ of buyers who purchase
information is again zero in both cases (for c below but close to the threshold for information
to be acquired), the change in total welfare equals the change in the payoﬀ of the seller, ∆πS
S,
plus the payoﬀ of the buyer (BN) who remains uninformed.19 That is20:





Thus, underinvestment obtains whenever πS
BN > 0. Since the payoﬀ of the uninformed buyer







the result follows. Notice that the source of the ineﬃciency is here only the informational free
riding of the uninformed buyer, not the rent dissipation by the indirectly informed buyers,
in contrast to what we found in section 3.3 when the information provider is a buyer.
Another natural question is whether information acquisition is more eﬃcient if carried
out by the owner of the good rather than by a potential buyer. Comparing the threshold
for a potential buyer to acquire information derived in theorem 1, cI, with the one obtained
in proposition 3 for the owner of the good, we ﬁnd that ineﬃciency is more severe with the

























19As shown in the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix, the seller’s optimal choice is always to selle
information to all buyers but one.
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As shown in Claim 5 in the Appendix, this condition is satisﬁed if K − N is suﬃciently
large, or if K < 6. When N is much smaller than K, the probability that two agents like the
same type of object is quite small. Hence, the rent dissipation, the source of ineﬃciency for
the buyer as information provider, is small, while the payoﬀ from free riding is large with N
small.
Should the seller of the good always be trusted as a more reliable source of information
than a potential buyer of the good? Before concluding this section we would like to argue
that while this is true, as we have seen, in the speciﬁc set-up considered earlier, it is not in
general and also the owner of the good faces conﬂicts of interests in his reporting strategy.
A ﬁrst illustration of this fact is provided here, by examining the case where the seller is
informed about the buyers’ types and establishing the following claim made earlier:22






. If the owner of the good has acquired information and,
before sending his report, asks buyers to report their type, in a maximal truth-telling equilib-
rium he sometimes reports a lie m  = v. In addition, his expected equilibrium payoﬀ is lower
than when he does not ask buyers to report their type.
As shown in the proof in the Appendix, if the owner of the good learns the buyers’ type
and ﬁnds that none of the buyers happen to like the object, he is not willing to report the
true type of the object, but prefers to lie and report one of the buyers’ types. Similarly, if
the seller learns that only one of the buyers likes the object but at least two other buyers
like a diﬀerent type of the object, i.e. say v = θi only for i = 1 but θ2 = θ3  = θ1, he prefers
to report θ2 rather than the truth. The reason is that these lies allow to increase buyers’
demand for the object and thus the price at which the object is sold in the auction. In all
other circumstances (i.e. when he ﬁnds that at least two of the buyers like the object), the
owner of the good is willing to report the true type of the object. Thus his report still
contains some, though now imperfect, information over the true type of the object.
21Note that (11) is the reverse inequality of (6), which describes the condition under which ∆πS > 0. By
comparing (7) and (10) we see in fact that a buyer is more eﬃcient than the seller of the good as provider
of information, or (11) holds, when πBS
N > ∆πS + πBN; that is, since πBS



















is violated, such condition is the important case to consider to verify whether we can achieve full eﬃciency
with the seller as information provider .
25Given the above reporting strategy of the seller, the equilibrium allocation will not always
be ex post eﬃcient, as sometimes the object will end up in the hands of a buyer who does
not like it even when there is another buyer who likes it23. This ineﬃciency together with
the lower informational content of the reports sold adversely aﬀect the buyers’ willingness to
pay for information and hence the seller’s revenue from the sale of information, as well as his
revenue from the auction when buyers happen to like the object. We show that altogether
such negative eﬀects prevail over the positive eﬀect on the auction revenue which obtains
when buyers of information do not like the object, so that the expected payoﬀ of the owner
of the good is indeed higher if he does not know the buyers’ types.
The conﬂict of interest we just identiﬁed is an important one. Lying about the type
of the good in order to increase the demand of the object in the market is akin in fact to
the “hyping” of securities by analysts which inspired the counter-measures in title V of the
Sarbanes-Oxley act (as well as the authors of the report of the European Commission Forum
Group 2003). Such lies happen in spite of the fact that information here is not about the
quality, but the variety of the good for sale. It will occur ‘a fortiori’ when information
concerns quality as well, i.e. when elements of vertical diﬀerentiation of the information are
introduced (see our discussion in section 6).
4.3 Who will sell information?
So far, we considered situations where only one type of trader has the ‘license’ to sell
information. We discuss here brieﬂy what happens when all three types of traders (poten-
tial buyers, disinterested traders and owner of the good) can compete among them for the
acquisition and sale of information.
The ﬁrst thing to note is that the entry of a second agent as a seller of information will
drive the price of information down to zero, for reasons analogous to those explained in
Section 3.2. Given this, the only incentive for an agent to enter the market and disrupt the
equilibria with a monopolist provider of information may come from the eﬀects that entering
has on the agent’s payoﬀ in the auction. This immediately implies that an uninterested
trader, whose only payoﬀ is given by the revenue from the sale of information, can never
gain from entering and hence never wants to disrupt any monopolist equilibrium. Also, as
argued in that same section, when there is already one agent selling information the payoﬀ
23This will happen in particular when only one buyer likes the true type of the object while at least two
other buyers like the same type: in that event, as we said, the seller prefers to report their type in order to
extract a higher price in the auction.
26in the auction of a buyer is always the same whether he acquires information directly or
indirectly. Since the price at which a monopolist sells information is always less or equal to
c, a buyer never strictly gains by entering. This leaves the owner of the good as the only
potential disrupter of monopolist equilibria.
When a disinterested trader is a monopolist seller of information, as shown in Proposition
2, he sells information to all buyers except one and always reveals the true value of the object.
Hence in that case entry only aﬀects the information available to the single buyer who is
not purchasing information and we can verify (see proof of the next Proposition) that the
change in the auction revenue of the owner of the object if he enters is zero so that entry
is never proﬁtable. But when the monopolist seller of information is a potential buyer, he
does not always tell the truth and then entry also aﬀects the information revealed to the
agents purchasing information. Consider in particular the case where the cost of acquiring
information is low (c < c0). With a potential buyer as an information monopolist the auction
price is either 0, as stated in Theorem 1, or 1. If the owner of the good enters the market,
the auction price will never be lower and will increase from 0 to 1 in the event where the
directly informed buyer likes the good and at least one other buyer also likes it. That event
has probability 1/K
 
1 − ((K − 1)/K)
N−1
 
, and one can easily verify that such probability,
which equals to the increase in auction revenue, is greater than c0. Thus there are no equilibria
with a buyer as an information monopolist when c < c0. The incentives to enter in the other
case (c ≥ c0) can be analyzed with a similar reasoning.
More formally, we have:
Proposition 5 Suppose all types of traders are allowed to acquire information and compete
among them for its sale. In this case:
1. All the equilibria we found when only the owner of the object or only disinterested
traders are allowed to sell information remain (monopolist) equilibria in this case.
The same is true also for the (duopoly) equilibria with two potential buyers selling
information.
2. An equilibrium with a potential buyer as an information monopolist exists only when





















Thus we can say that the owner of the object is the most aggressive trader in the pursuit
of the sale of information.
275 How can Eﬃciency be Attained?
We discuss in this section some possible ways to overcome the ineﬃciencies described in the
previous sections. They vary according to the type of the agent selling information.
5.1 Diﬀerentiation of the information sold
We allow here informed traders to sell diﬀerent kinds of reports over their information, at
diﬀerent prices. Thus there can be diﬀerentiation of the information transmitted, and the
extent of such diﬀerentiation will be optimally chosen by the seller. We consider ﬁrst, in the
next subsection, the case where the seller of information is a potential buyer and is always a
monopolist, i.e. entry to the market for the sale of information is restricted to a single trader.
We then discuss in the following subsection the consequences of eliminating this restriction
and allowing, as in the previous sections, for free entry in the market for information.
A (potential buyer as a) monopolist seller
To see why the diﬀerentiation of information may allow to increase the proﬁts of the seller
of information, recall that, as we saw, when a single type of report is sold the price a buyer is
willing to pay for information depends on the number J of other buyers who choose to remain
uninformed. Purchasing information is indeed valuable for the buyer because it gives him
an informational advantage over the uninformed buyers, which manifests itself in a priority
over uninformed buyers in obtaining the good when the buyer likes it. When a single type of
report is sold, there are up to three information, and hence priority, levels. First, the directly
informed buyer, then all the indirectly informed buyers (who share the same priority level),
ﬁnally the uninformed buyers, when they exist. The larger is the number J of buyers in the
last level, the more valuable is the information of indirectly informed buyers. We now show
that, by diﬀerentiating the reports sold, the seller of information can arrange the indirectly
informed buyers into several distinct priority levels, and by so doing can increase his revenue.
Hence, the incentives for information acquisition improve, as the rent dissipation, which was
shown in Section 3.3 to be at the root of ineﬃciency in information acquisition, is reduced
(if not eliminated).
Notice that, to implement an eﬀective diﬀerentiation of the reports sold, the seller must
have some information over buyers’ preferences. As argued in the previous sections, buyers
are only willing to truthfully report their type when the seller is a potential buyer or a
disinterested trader but not when he is the owner of the good. Hence the results obtained
28here hold not only when the monopolist seller of information is a potential buyer but also
when he is a disinterested trader, but not when he is the owner of the good.
The seller of information chooses now the number of types of reports and the prices at
which he is willing to sell them. We will consider in particular the case where the diﬀerent
types of reports oﬀered for sale can always be arranged in a hierarchy of reports of decreasing
quality, or informativeness. Let L denote the number of diﬀerent types of reports sold. The
hierarchy of the qualities of the diﬀerent reports is modeled by assuming that the seller issues
L messages and buyers purchasing a report of type l, l ∈ {1,..,L} observe all the messages
mj, j = l,..,L. The information provided by the reports has then a nested structure, in the
sense that receiving any report i > l conveys no additional information when compared to
report l, while the reverse is not true. Hence report 1 has the highest quality and report
L the lowest. We consider again the case where the set of possible messages available to
the sellers of information for any l is the set of direct messages, ml ∈ M = {1,2,...,K}.
Facing the menu of reports on oﬀer, and the prices pl, l = 1,..,L, at which they sell, each
uninformed buyer chooses which report to buy.
We characterize ﬁrst the equilibria of the subgame starting from the node where a single
buyer, say B1, has acquired information and is selling diﬀerentiated information in the mar-
ket. For any given level of L we determine the optimal choice of B1 concerning the prices
posted for the diﬀerent reports and the equilibrium strategies in the rest of the subgame
(purchase of information by the uninformed buyers Bi, i = 2,..,N, reporting strategies and
bids in the auction). On this basis we can then ﬁnd the level of L which maximizes the
revenue of the seller B1. Finally, we compare this value of the revenue to the cost c; when it
is higher we conclude that information acquisition is worthwhile for the seller and will take
place in equilibrium.
There are still two phases in the reporting of messages. First each buyer of information
sends a report over his type to the seller of information. Subsequently the seller sends the
messages ml, l = 1,..,L and, for any l ∈ {1,..,L}, the buyers of report of type l receive the
messages (ml,ml+1,..,mL). We focus our attention on the equilibria where agents’ reporting
is again characterized by the maximal degree of truthfulness and is now also consistent with
the diﬀerentiation of information in L levels.
To describe the reporting strategies, it is convenient to adopt some notational conventions.
Given the hierarchical structure of the information, we will sometimes refer to the buyers
purchasing from B1 a report of quality l as the buyers in layer l of the hierarchy. For any
l ≥ 2, let Nl(B1) denote then the set of buyers purchasing a report of type i ≥ l (i.e.
29who are in layer l or below) and Nl(B1) the number of diﬀerent realizations of θi across all
buyers Bi ∈ Nl(B1); hence Nl(B1)/Nl+1(B1) indicates the set of buyers in layer l. N1(B1)
is similarly deﬁned and indicates the set of buyers who purchased any type of report from
B1. We will show that there is an equilibrium where the uninformed buyers always report











for all y  = θj, Bj ∈ N1(B1)
, if v = θ1
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ml−1, if ml−1  = θi for all i ∈ Nl−1(B1)/Nl(B1)
y,
 
with probability 1/[K − N1(B1)],
for all y  = θj, Bj ∈ N1(B1)
, if ml−1 = θi for someBi∈ Nl−1(B1)/Nl(B1)
(13)
Thus at each layer l the informed trader tells the truth as long as the true variety of the
object does not coincide with his own type or with the type of any buyer who has purchased
information of higher quality. Otherwise, the informed trader randomizes over any variety
diﬀerent from the type of any of the agents who purchased information.
With this message structure the equilibrium exhibits a few other interesting features.
Proposition 6 When we allow for the diﬀerentiation of the information sold, with a mo-
nopolist seller of information there is an equilibrium where information acquisition takes













the seller adopts the truthful reporting strategy (12), (13) and we have maximal diﬀerentiation
(a diﬀerent report is sold to each buyer). Also, information is sold to all other buyers (i.e.












and otherwise to all other buyers except one (L = N − 2).
Figure 2 summarizes the result.
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No uninformed buyer One uninformed buyer
Figure 2: Equilibrium with heterogeneous messages
Thus the optimal choice for a monopolist seller is to design the hierarchy of reports sold
and the prices posted so that each buyer chooses to purchase one report, and each type of
report is purchased by only one agent. We have so only one buyer of information in each
layer, in each priority level, i.e. the maximal degree of diﬀerentiation as possible. The key
insight in the argument of the proof for this result is that the payoﬀ of a buyer purchasing a
given report only depends on the total number of other buyers who are equally or better
informed than him. Hence the price such buyer is willing to pay for information does not
change if anybody who is equally informed gets instead a higher quality report. The one
who does that, however, improves his priority level and hence his payoﬀ, and therefore is
willing to pay more. Thus when the same type of report is sold to two buyers, the seller of
information can always increase his revenue from the sale of information by improving the
quality of the report which is sold to one of them. Furthermore, this will have no eﬀect on
the seller’s payoﬀ in the auction (since the price at which he gets the object only depends
on whether or not there are uninformed traders). By induction, the best is to completely
diﬀerentiate the information sold to each buyer who is purchasing information.
Notice that the threshold for information acquisition to take place with a monopolist
seller of diﬀerentiated information, cI,diff in (14), is the same as the one found in (2) for the
eﬃciency of the investment in information. Hence the equilibrium is now eﬃcient, not only
with regard to the properties of the allocation but also of the information acquisition. This
is due to the fact that, by selling a diﬀerent report to each buyer, the seller of information,
B1, can ensure that all buyers are completely ranked, so that there will never be ties in the
auction and hence no rent dissipation. Hence B1 can appropriate now all the social surplus
generated by the acquisition of information.24
24Notice that the free-riding by the uninformed buyer still occurs in this case. However, as argued in
section 3.3, this only negatively aﬀects the owner of the good, not the seller of information.
31Condition (15) reﬂects a tradeoﬀ for the seller of information that is similar to the one
found in the case of homogeneous information. When there is an uninformed buyer the price
at which the object is gained in the auction is higher, both for the directly and the indirectly
informed buyers, than if everybody purchases information. On the other hand, when there
is no uninformed buyer the value of any buyer’s outside option, i.e. his payoﬀ if he were to
remain uninformed, is higher, so that the maximum willingness to pay and hence the revenue
from the sale of information is lower than when not all buyers purchase information. The
key diﬀerence with respect to the homogeneous information case is that now the provider
of information can get a positive revenue from the sale of information also when all buyers
purchase a report. Because of this, the maximal level of c at which in equilibrium all buyers
purchase information is higher (that is, c0,diff > c0).
Remark 1 Notice that there is a close relationship between diﬀerentiation and resale of
information. Our results can in fact be reinterpreted as describing the outcome when the
agents who purchase information are able to resell it. In that case in equilibrium a single
buyer purchases information from the informed trader, and then sells, at a lower price, a
noisier report which is purchased by only one buyer, who in turn sells an even noisier report
to a single buyer, and so on.
Free Entry
In the previous section we have seen that the diﬀerentiation of the information sold allows
a monopolist to achieve an eﬃcient outcome. However, we show here that it also makes
the monopolist’s position much more vulnerable to entry. In the case of homogeneous in-
formation, we know from Theorem 1 that with free entry in the market for information
in equilibrium there is at most a single seller and monopoly is the only outcome for most
parameter values. Now this is no longer true.
Proposition 7 When the cost of information c is not too high, there is always an equilib-
rium with at least two sellers of information (clearly ineﬃcient). Each of them chooses to
sell the same number of diﬀerent reports as in the monopoly equilibrium and to adopt the
same reporting strategies, (12) and (13).
To understand this result we have to remember what prevented multiple entry when
homogeneous information is sold. In that situation a buyer of information was never willing
to pay a positive price to purchase an additional report from a second seller. His position
was in fact in the intermediate priority level, between the informed sellers of information
32and the uninformed buyers, and such position was unaﬀected (i.e. his surplus in the auction
unchanged) by the purchase of a second report. Given this, the only possible outcome was
intense competition among sellers of information driving its price down to zero.
On the contrary, when the information providers sell diﬀerentiated reports every buyer
who is considering to buy a report not of the lowest quality needs to buy the same type of
report from each seller to be able to retain the position in the hierarchy of information -
and hence the priority level - such report is meant to deliver. If he fails to buy this report
from one of the providers, the traders who buy reports of lower quality from such provider
would be able to compete with him for the object on the same terms, hence the buyer
would not get the object with a positive payoﬀ when both he and any of these other traders
like the object. This fact creates the possibility of a collusive outcome where each seller of
information, instead of lowering prices so as to attract all customers only to him, prefers to
set prices in such a way that every buyer will purchase a report from all the sellers. In this
way the seller can gain positive proﬁts by sharing the monopoly rents with the other sellers.
The outcome with a monopolist seller of heterogeneous information can also be sustained
at an equilibrium with free entry. It can in fact be easily veriﬁed that the strategies where,
whenever another trader enters the market for the sale of information, each seller chooses
not to diﬀerentiate the information, i.e. to sell a homogeneous report, constitute another
equilibrium of the subgame. In such situation, as shown in Section 3, information is sold at
a zero price and hence entry is not proﬁtable. However this requires the sellers of information
to coordinate on what is, from their point of view, a Pareto inferior subgame equilibrium.
5.2 Entry fee for the auction
We propose here an alternative way to restore ﬁrst best eﬃciency, when the seller of infor-
mation is the owner of the good. Suppose he could charge any potential buyer an entry
fee to participate in the auction. Then if the owner of the good sets such fee equal to the
rent obtained by the uninformed individual in the equilibrium without entry fee (which is,
remember, (K − 1)
N−1 /KN) and rebates it to all those traders who purchase information
from him, he can extract from all the buyers the full surplus generated by the information.
Hence the social incentives for information acquisition are aligned with the individual incen-
tives for the owner of the good and eﬃciency obtains. At the same time, we should point
out that this is only true if the owner of the object has no information over the buyers’ types
and can credibly commit not to seek such information. When these conditions are not met,
as we saw in Section 4.2, the outcome is always ineﬃcient when the seller of information is
33the owner of the good.
6 Discussion
The model considered is quite versatile and has allowed us to study information acquisition,
transmission and trade upon this information in a number of setups. The information trans-
mitted may be homogeneous or heterogeneous, the seller of information may be a potential
buyer of the good, the seller or a “neutral” third party. We show next that the analysis
and conclusions drawn are fairly robust with respect to changes in various features of the
speciﬁcation. Finally we discuss the consequences of introducing some elements of vertical
diﬀerentiation in the uncertainty concerning the object traded for the eﬃciency of the mar-
ket and for the conclusions drawn concerning the desirability of diﬀerent forms of regulatory
interventions.
6.1 Some robustness checks
6.1.1 Organization of the market for information
How would the equilibrium properties change with alternative assumptions concerning who
and when the price for information is posted? Suppose the sellers of information were to
post the price after - rather than before - having learnt the signal realization. Then the
price posted would have a signaling value, as a seller may want to post a diﬀerent price after
having learnt that he likes or does not like the object. In this case we should expect a large
set of equilibria to exist. Clearly an equilibrium with properties analogous to the ones found
in Theorem 1 (where the price posted conveys no information) still exists. There are other
pooling equilibria, but with lower prices (and thus lower eﬃciency),25 and under maximal
truth-telling there is no separating equilibrium.26
Consider next the case where the price is posted by buyers, rather than sellers of infor-
mation, again before the latter have learnt the realization of the signal. Each buyer can then
25Those are sustained by the oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs that a deviator posting a higher price is a buyer who
likes the object, from whom nobody wants to purchase information.
26At a separating equilibrium there are two distinct prices which signal that a seller of information likes,
respectively does not like, the object. At the ﬁrst one the seller is expected to bid 1 and so no buyer is
willing to pay anything for information. At the second one the seller is expected to tell the truth (under
maximal truth-telling), thus information is valuable and its sale also allows to decrease the price at which
the object is gained in the auction. Thus, the seller of information would strictly gain by deviating when he
likes the good and posting the second price.
34post a price contingent on the number of other buyers who also purchase information27. We
claim that in such case the equilibria would have similar, though not exactly identical, fea-
tures to the ones we found. In particular, each buyer of information sets a price equal to his
maximal willingness to pay for the information, except when the number of the other buyers
of information equals its maximum minus one (e.g. N −3 with a monopolist seller given by
a potential buyer), in which case he sets a price equal to zero, which is lower than his true
maximal willingness to pay for information. This is because, if all buyers of information were
to report their true willingness to pay also when the number of other buyers is N − 3, and
the seller were indeed to sell to a total of N − 2 buyers, i.e. to all potential buyers but one,
each buyer of information would have an incentive to deviate and post a lower price. By so
doing the buyer would make sure he is the one not purchasing information, i.e. remaining
uninformed, which gives him a strictly positive payoﬀ. Given these strategies of the buyers,
the optimal response of the seller of information is, for c low to sell information to everybody
at a zero price (as in region 3. of Theorem 1) and, for intermediate values of c, to sell at a
positive price to all the potential buyers less two (unlike in region 2. of the Theorem). In
this second case the payoﬀ of all potential buyers of information, both those who actually
purchase it and those who don’t, is zero.
What are then the consequences of alternative speciﬁcation of the message subgame?
Suppose the set M of available messages is enlarged to include also an empty message, a
blank report. This message allows an alternative form of deception of buyers: whenever the
seller of information is interested in the object and thus faces a conﬂict of interest, he could
send buyers a completely uninformative message, i.e. one that does not change their priors
(which can be interpreted as providing buyers with no advice, or report). It is fairly easy to
verify that in all the equilibria where this alternative form of deception is used the utility of
the seller of information is lower than in the one considered before (with reporting strategy
(1))28 and hence the underinvestment in information problem more severe. On the other
hand, if phase a. of the message game did not exist, so that only the seller of information
can send a report to buyers, the seller would no longer be able to deceive buyers by telling
them, in some at least partially credible way, they are not interested in the object. The
best form of deception for the seller, when the set of available messages is M enlarged to
include an empty report, is indeed to send such report, i.e. a completely uninformative
message. Hence his payoﬀ would be lower than when phase a. exists or the seller (if he is
27It is easy to verify such property is needed for the equilibrium not to be trivial.
28The key reason is that, on receipt of this completely uninformative message the optimal bid of buyers is
1/K, not 0.
35a potential buyer) has some information about buyers’ preferences. One could argue that
in many situations the providers of information indeed have such information and use it in
their reports.
6.1.2 Auction Format
We have assumed throughout that the object is sold via a second price auction. Since
information transmission generates correlation in the values of the agents, one cannot invoke
revenue equivalence to justify such choice. However, we can argue at least that a ﬁrst
price auction is likely to generate less rents for the informed buyer and possibly ex-post
misallocations (hence worse incentives for information acquisition and lower welfare). The
reason is that with a ﬁrst price auction a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. To ﬁx
ideas, think of a message strategy as in (1). Any (pure strategy) bid by the informed buyer
(when the good is of his preferred type) above the expected value of the other buyers (after
receiving the report sent by the informed buyer) would induce them to bid zero , as that
would be their valuation conditional on winning the auction. This would make the bid of the
informed buyer suboptimal. But any (pure strategy) bid by the informed buyer below this
expected value would induce the other buyers to bid above the informed buyer, which would
not be optimal for him either. Pure strategy bids by indirectly informed or uninformed buyers
could not be equilibrium strategies for analogous reasons. A mixed strategy equilibrium
clearly leads to ex-post suboptimal allocations with positive probability, higher prices in the
auction for the informed buyer and lower revenues from selling information.
Another assumption is that a single unit of the object is available for sale. Suppose
multiple - say Q > 1 - units of the good were up for sale and each buyer has a positive utility
only for one unit, thus a limited capacity for “enjoying” the good in the market. Let the
good be sold via a (Q+1)-th price auction. When the seller of information likes the object,
if there is no diﬀerentiation of the quality of the information sold, he will lie to all buyers so
as to lower competition in the auction, as he does when there is a single unit. But now this
will lead to some units of the object being sold to buyers who do not like them and hence to
a possible ex-post ineﬃciency of the equilibrium allocation. Notice that this problem does
not arise if the seller diﬀerentiates the quality of the information sold, as in Section 5.1; with
such diﬀerentiation is allowed, the eﬃciency of the equilibrium could be preserved.
366.2 Introducing Vertical Diﬀerentiation of the Information
In the environment considered so far the uncertainty only concerns a horizontal diﬀerentiation
element, the type or variety of the object over which buyers have idiosyncratic tastes. It is
thus important to examine the consequences of allowing also for the presence of a vertical
diﬀerentiation element, quality, over which buyers’ preferences tend to agree.
To this end, consider the following extension of the model. Suppose the good not only
comes in one of the K types we described, but also in one of 2 quality levels, H (High) and
L (Low). Formally, the true type of the good is now v = (k,q) ∈ S ≡ K×{H,L}. Suppose,
in addition, that buyers are also of two types: while all buyers only care for one, randomly
drawn variety, some of them are sensitive to quality (Se) and others are insensitive to quality
(In). An In consumer has a constant valuation of 1 for a good of the variety he likes. A Se
consumer values a good of the type he likes V if the good is of H quality, and 0 if it is of
L quality. Let us assume for simplicity that H and L have identical probabilities for each
variety of good, and that consumers have identical probabilities to be of type Se and In.
Also, consider again the case where the set of available messages to the seller of informa-
tion is the set of direct messages: M′ = S, so that a generic message m is now a pair (k,q),
where k ∈ K, q ∈ {H,L}. We show next that, when the seller of information is the owner of
the object, whenever he perfectly reveals in equilibrium the true variety k of the object, he
never reveals any information over the quality of the object:
Proposition 8 Suppose the set of possible types of the good is given by S and the owner
of the object is the seller of information. Then at any equilibrium where the seller truthfully
reveals the variety of the object, that is where for all m ∈ M′, Pr(k = i|m) = 1 for some
i ∈ K, we have Pr(q = H|m) = Pr(q = H) = 1
2. Thus, if V > 2, the Se type buyers always
bid more for the good than the In type buyers, and vice versa if V < 2.
Hence we can never have at the same time perfect revelation of the true variety and the
true quality of the object.29 It follows that the equilibrium allocation of the good is ex post
ineﬃcient, which in turn implies that not all social surplus can be appropriated by the seller,
and so that there will be underinvestment in information acquisition.
The source of the ineﬃciency is that when the seller of information is the owner of the
object he faces a conﬂict of interest, analogous to the one we found in the second part of
Section 4.2, which induces him to want to lie to exaggerate how much buyers like the good
29Some revelation over the true quality of the object could be obtained at equilibrium, but only at the
cost of partial revelation over the true variety.
37so as to increase his revenue from the sale of the good. Notice that analogous features - ex
post ineﬃciency due to false reports - obtain when the seller of information is a potential
buyer (the circumstances and form of the lie are however diﬀerent in that case: the seller
wishes to lie only when he likes the object and tells buyers the variety and quality of the
good is not “right for them”). The only case where the report sent is always truthful and
the equilibrium allocation remains ex post eﬃcient is the one where the seller of information
is a disinterested trader.
7 Conclusion
Good quality information is key to a properly functioning market. This has long been
understood by academics as well as by practitioners and regulators. But market participants
are not endowed always with all necessary information, and typically obtain it, often from
other actors in the market. For this reason, authorities have established numerous rules
on the amount and kinds of communication between market participants and information
providers. Surprisingly, there is little research into the interplay between acquisition of
information, its transfer and actions in the market, which would be necessary to provide
foundations for such policy. We partly ﬁll this gap by building a formal model of a market
environment with costly acquisition and unveriﬁable transmission of information. In this
set-up we can investigate the conﬂicts of interest faced by the information providers, see how
they vary according to the type of the provider, in which directions they limit the extent of
truthful transmission of information and examine the consequences for the performance of
the market.
We ﬁnd that when information concerns a prevalent horizontal diﬀerentiation component,
there are typically ineﬃciencies because of underinvestment in information acquisition. Usual
regulatory interventions, such as ﬁrewalls, or limiting the sale of information to parties which
have no interest in trading the underlying object, worsen the ineﬃciencies. In contrast,
eﬃciency can be attained with a monopolist selling diﬀerentiated information, if additional
entry is blocked. When, on the other hand, the vertical diﬀerentiation element is more
relevant, ﬁrewalls can be beneﬁcial. As we argued in the introduction, both the horizontal
and the vertical elements are likely to be part of the information problem in real markets. We
thus provide a tool to assess the potential beneﬁts of establishing various kinds of regulations.
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40Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1 (further details)
We provide here the missing details of the proof of the Theorem.
Optimal pricing rules and payoﬀs with a monopolist seller of information
As argued in Section 3.2, to ﬁnd the optimal pricing strategy of a monopolist seller of
information in the subgame starting in stage 2 of the game, we derive ﬁrst the maximal
willingness to pay for information of an uninformed buyer for each given number J of buyers
who choose not to acquire information. Let us denote such situation as conﬁguration J,
where J ∈ {0,1,..,N − 2}.
Let, w.l.o.g., B1 be the seller of information, B2,..,BN−J indicate the traders buying
information from the single seller and BN−J+1,...,BN be the J buyers not purchasing infor-
mation in conﬁguration J, i.e. when there are J ≥ 0 buyers not purchasing information.
The payoﬀ of buyer Bi in such conﬁguration is then denoted by πJ
Bi. The value of the outside









U) indicate the expected utility of buyer B2,..,BN−J if, rather than purchasing informa-
tion, he were to acquire information directly (resp. to stay uninformed). For the buyers








I ) is now the
expected utility of a buyer BN−J+1,...,BN if, rather than staying uninformed, he were to
acquire information directly (resp. to purchase information). Let then p(J) be the price
posted by the seller of information, that is the price which maximizes his revenue among all
the prices that support such conﬁguration.
J > 0. From the discussion in Section 3.2, it is immediate to see that when J > 0 the payoﬀs




































K if J = 1




































































if J = 1.
It is then immediate to see that the optimal pricing rule of the monopolist seller
of information in any conﬁguration J ≥ 1 is to set the price equal to the maximal











Furthermore, conﬁguration J = 1 is always attainable since from the above expressions








I} holds with the pricing















is also satisﬁed, when
it is violated no conﬁguration J > 1 is attainable since the uninformed buyers always
prefer, no matter what is the level of p, to become directly informed.
















− p(0) for i = 2,..,N






















C and the optimal pricing rule for such conﬁguration is
p(0) = 0,
again equal to the maximal willingness to pay of buyers.
On this basis we can provide now the:















 N−J for all J = 1,..,N − 2. We then show that the revenue from the sale of
information is always higher in conﬁguration J than in J + 1, for all J = 1,..,N − 3:
(N − (J + 1))p(J) ≥ (N − (J + 2))p(J + 1)















(N − (J + 1))




⇐⇒ K − 1 ≥ N − (J + 2),
always satisﬁed since K > N.













 N− ¯ J
(19)






 N−J for J = 1,.., ¯ J − 1 and p( ¯ J) = c. By the same argument as above, the revenue
is higher at J = 1 than at any other J = 2,.., ¯ J − 1. Thus we only need to compare the
revenue in conﬁguration J = 1 with the one at J = ¯ J (where p( ¯ J) = c) and show that, for
all ¯ J ∈ {2,..,N − 2}:
(N − 2)p(1) ≥
 
N − ( ¯ J + 1
 
)p( ¯ J)







≥ (N − ( ¯ J + 1))c








≥ (N − 3)c
43Using the same argument as in the previous paragraph we can show that the following
















Since conﬁguration J = 1 is always attainable and gives also a higher revenue than J = 0
(p(1) as in (17) is strictly positive while p(0) = 0). ￿
Proof of Claim 2. Given Claim 1, to ﬁnd the optimal pricing rule of the monopolist







































































Equilibrium pricing rules and payoﬀs with an information oligopoly An alterna-
tive situation which may arise in the subgame starting in stage 2 has M ≥ 2 sellers of infor-
mation (w.l.o.g. let them be B1,...,BM) and N − M buyers of information (BJ+1,...,BN).
Let us denote it as conﬁguration OL(M). In this case, as we argued in the main text, each
seller posts a zero price for information and each uninformed buyer purchases information
from all sellers. The payoﬀs in this case are:
π
OL(M)














 N−1 , i = M + 1,..,N
44Payoﬀs with no sale of information The last possibility is conﬁguration No, where no
buyer acquires information, hence all buyers stay uninformed and make a bid equal to their
expected valuation, 1/K. The object is then randomly allocated to one buyer, who pays for
it an amount equal to his expected value for the good and hence gets no surplus and the
payoﬀ of every buyer is:
π
No
Bi = 0 for all i = 1,..,N




Bi = 0 ≥
 
π1
B1 = , if c ≥ c0
π0
B1, if c < c0 .
The second set of conditions, 0 ≥ π0








which never holds. The ﬁrst one, 0 ≥ π1





































































Bi, for i = 2,..,N − 1, if c ≥ c0
π0





B3 , for i = 3,..,N (24)













































which is never satisﬁed. Finally, it is immediate to see that condition (24) always holds.
We conclude that a duopoly obtains as an equilibrium outcome of the overall game when
cD ≥ c ≥ c0.￿
This completes the analysis of the possible conﬁgurations which may arise at equilibrium
and hence the proof of Theorem 1. ￿
Proof of Proposition 1
The result follows immediately by comparing the threshold for eﬃcient information ac-
quisition, found in (2), with the threshold found in Theorem 1 for information acquisition
not to take place in equilibrium, given by (22). We show next that the interval of values of




































Since the term on the left hand side approaches one as K → ∞, it suﬃces to show that this
term is always strictly increasing in K to be able to conclude that (25) holds for all K,N.
Notice that a term is increasing if its logarithm is increasing. Taking then the logarithm of





























which is strictly positive since we always have K > 1 and N > 3. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2
The maximal price a buyer is willing to pay for information when a total number J






. By a similar argument we can also show that a result anal-
ogous to Claim 1 still holds when information is sold by an agent diﬀerent from a potential
buyer: the revenue from the sale of information of a monopolist seller is maximal when
46information is sold to all buyers except one, i.e. in this case to N − 1 buyers. Hence, if
information is acquired and sold by a disinterested trader his payoﬀ, equal to this revenue,
is:









− c ≥ 0. (26)
It is immediate to see from (26) that an equilibrium exists with information acquisition by
a disinterested trader if:








Hence to prove the result it suﬃces to show that the threshold found in (22) for information




































which is clearly always true. ￿
Proof of Proposition 3
The payoﬀ of the seller of the good when he acquires and sells information is given by the
sum of his information and auction revenues. As already argued in the proof of Proposition
2, the information revenue is maximal when information is sold to all buyers except one.
The auction revenue, when the number of buyers remaining uninformed is J ≥ 2, is either
1/K (if no informed buyer likes the object) or 1 (if more than one informed buyer likes the
object). Thus, when J ≥ 2 the auction revenue decreases with J, as the probability that
more than one informed buyer likes the object is decreasing in J. Putting this together with
the fact that the revenue from the sale of information is also decreasing in J for J > 0, we
get that the payoﬀ of the seller of the object is higher in conﬁguration J = 2 than in any
other conﬁguration J > 2. To ﬁnd the optimal choice of the seller it remains so to compare
his payoﬀ at J = 2 with that at conﬁgurations J = 0 and J = 1.
The payoﬀ when J = 2 is30


































30This expression holds when the cost c is not too low (the case of interest when investigating the threshold











47When J = 1 the seller’s revenue from the auction is either 0 (if no buyer who purchases
information likes the object), 1/K (if exactly one buyer who purchases information likes the
object), and 1 otherwise. Summing the information revenue the seller’s payoﬀ is:
































identical to the payoﬀ when J = 2. When J = 0, since the price at which information is sold
is zero, the seller’s payoﬀ is simply his auction revenue (equal to 0 in this case if no buyer,














































always holds. Thus, the seller’s payoﬀ is maximized by setting the price of information so
that J = 1 or J = 2. Information is acquired in equilibrium if the seller’s payoﬀ with J = 1










The claim of the Proposition follows by comparing the threshold for eﬃcient information























Claim 5 When K − N is suﬃciently large, or K < 6, eﬃciency is higher if information is
provided by a potential buyer rather than by the owner of the object (condition (11) holds).
Otherwise, the opposite holds.
Proof. Since the term on the left hand side of (11) approaches one as K → ∞ , if
for K large such term is strictly decreasing in K we can say that condition (11) holds, for
48K large. Taking the logarithm of the term on the left hand side of (11) and diﬀerentiating




























which is strictly negative if and only if (N − 2)2 < K. This implies that the term on
the left hand side of (11) is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing in K. Hence condition (11)
necessarily holds for K suﬃciently large (relative to N). Furthermore, it holds for all K > N







which is true for K < 6 and false for K ≥ 6. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4
Denote by P the price paid to gain the object in the auction and by p the price of
information. Let then BWin
i be the event in which buyer Bi wins the auction and EBi the
expectation conditional on Bi’s information at stage 2 of the game. The general expression
of the payoﬀ of a buyer of information is:
πBi = Pr(B
Win




i ) − p,
where the probabilities clearly depend on the number J > 0 of buyers who remain unin-
formed, on who sells information and his reporting strategy. When there is a monopolist
seller of information its price is then:
p = Pr(B
Win











U are as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Using (28), the equilibrium payoﬀ of the seller of the good when he is also the monopolist
seller of information and there are J > 0 uninformed buyers (say Bi, i = N − J + 1,..,N),
both when he knows and does not know buyers’ types, is given by the following expression:
π
S,J









































i |v = θi)Pr(v = θi)
￿











if the seller has no information on buyers’ types, as argued in the proof of Proposition 3,
max{πJ
C(S),πJ
U(S)} = 0 and the equilibrium payoﬀ of buyers of information is zero, for any
J ≥ 1. Also, whenever there is at least one (indirectly) informed buyer who likes the object
one of them always gets it, hence the surplus extracted by the seller of the object in that















+Pr(v = θi, for some i = 1,..,N − J) − c













i ) has the same value whether or not the seller of information









U(S)} is Pr(v = θi, for some





We show next that the same is true when J = 1. In particular, we will show that, when
the seller ask buyers to report their type, in equilibrium the uninformed buyer never gets
the object, Pr(BWin
N ) = 0. Hence the ﬁrst term of (29) is zero. Recalling that, as argued in
the previous paragraph, the other two terms of (29) are maximal at the equilibrium where
the seller has no information over buyers’ types, the result follows.
The message subgame is an in Section 2. At an equilibrium with maximal degree of
truthfulness of agents reporting the seller adopts the following reporting strategy:
i) if there is at least one pair i,j ∈ (1,..N − 1) such that θi = θj (i.e. there is a ’tie’) :
mS =
(
v if v = θi = θj for some i,j ∈ (1,..N − 1),
θi  = v if v = θk for at most one k ∈ (1,..,N − 1)
ii) if θi  = θj for all i,j ∈ (1,..,N − 1) (there are no ’ties’):
mS =
(
v if v = θi for some i ∈ (1,..N − 1),
θi  = v with probability 1/(N − 1) if v  = θi for all i = 1,..,N − 1
(31)
Thus the seller tells the truth only when at least two buyers of information like the object
(there is a tie on the truth) or all buyers like a diﬀerent type (there are no ties) and one of
them likes the object. On the other hand buyers still report truthfully their type:31
31The argument is similar to Theorem 1. By lying, the informational content of a ’good’ report, equal
50Claim 6 For any buyer who purchases information it is optimal to truthfully report his type
to the seller (given that all other buyers do that and the seller follows the reporting strategy
in (31).
To complete the argument for the case J = 1 it remains then to verify that
Claim 7 Given the seller’s reporting strategy in (31), there is always at least one indirectly
informed buyer whose bid is strictly greater than 1/K, and thus Pr(BWin
N ) = 0.










i |v = θi)Pr(v = θi)
￿
− c.
The equilibrium reporting strategy of the seller is analogous to the one described in equa-
tion (31), and buyers still want to report truthfully their type32. Thus the only possible
misallocation of the object is when only one of the N buyers likes the object and there is a





i |v = θi)Pr(v = θi)
￿
=
Pr(v = θi, for some i = 1,..,N) − Pr(v = θi, for exactly one i = 1,..,N and there is a tie)
As shown in the proof of Proposition 3, in the equilibrium where the seller has no information





S = Pr(v = θi, for some i = 1,..,N − 1) − c.
Hence the result is established by showing:
Claim 8
Pr(v = θi, for some i = 1,..,N − 1) >
Pr(v = θi, for some i = 1,..,N) − Pr(v = θi, for exactly one i = 1,..,N and there is a tie)
￿
Proof of Proposition 5 (missing details)
to a buyer’s type, is unaﬀected but the buyer will receive such report less often and only when competition
from other buyers is ﬁercer, so that his payoﬀ is also lower. The proofs of this and the next two claims
involve some straightforward computations and are then relegated to Appendix A.
32See the proof of Claim 6 in Appendix A.
511. It remains here to verify that, when the disinterested trader is the monopolist seller of
information, the change in the auction revenue of the owner of the object if he were to
enter the market for the sale of information is zero. Entry only changes the bidding
behavior of the single buyer (say BN) who in the monopoly equilibrium is uninformed
and in the case of entry also gets a truthful report. Thus the changes in auction revenue
are limited to the states where the bid of BN is pivotal, i.e. where only one of the ﬁrst
N − 1 buyers likes the object and BN, by becoming informed, raises the price from
1/K to 1 if he learns that he likes the object and lowers it to 0 if he learns that he




























always zero. Note that the same is true for the duopoly equilibrium where two potential
buyers sell information at a zero price since in that case all buyers are fully informed.












K2 (N − 2)
.
It is immediate to see that this inequality is always satisﬁed since it is equivalent to
K (N − 2) − 1







K (N − 2) − 1










This completes the proof of the claim in part 2. of the Proposition when c < c0. When
c ≥ c0 the change in the auction revenue of the owner of the good if he were to enter
(when a potential buyer is an information monopolist) is positive (goes from 1/K to
1) when the directly informed buyer and at least another buyer like the object and
negative (goes from 1/K to 0) when only one directly or indirectly informed buyer
likes the object. Thus the expected change in revenue is lower than the cost of entry























52Proof of Proposition 6
Most of this proof involves routine computations which are similar in nature to those of
Proposition 1 and have then been relegated to Appendix B. The only distinctive aspect is
given by the following Lemma, whose proof is then reported here.
Lemma 1 The optimal choice of the seller of information concerning the degree of diﬀeren-
tiation of the information sold is always to have as many types of reports as the number of
buyers of information.
Proof. Suppose there are two buyers purchasing the same type of report, say l. To
establish the result we show that the seller’s payoﬀ always increases by introducing some
diﬀerentiation in the report sold to each of them, that is if layer l of the hierarchy is split
into two adjacent ones, l′ < l′′ :
1. The price paid by the seller in the auction does not change.
2. Buyers’ willingness to pay for reports of a quality diﬀerent from l does not vary, since
the payoﬀ of a buyer in some layer i only depends on the total number of other buyers
in his same layer or above it, not on their distribution across such layers, and the ﬁrst
one is not aﬀected by the split.
3. By the same argument, the willingness to pay for the lower quality report l′′ is the
same as the one for report l before the split, while that for report l′ is strictly higher.￿
Proof of Proposition 7
To establish the result we only need to show that there is always an equilibrium of
the subgame with two sellers of information where they both make strictly positive proﬁts.
Suppose the ﬁrst seller oﬀers a complete hierarchy of reports, one for each of the N−2 buyers
of information, and charges a price equal to zero for the lowest quality report and a positive
price equal to half the maximal willingness to pay of a buyer for every other report. Then
we claim that the best response of the second seller is to do exactly the same. If he does
that, any buyer who considers purchasing a report of any quality (except the lowest one) will
buy it from both sellers. Purchasing the report only from one seller does not yield in fact
a priority level over all the buyers who purchase reports of lower quality, but is equivalent
to purchasing the lowest quality report. Such priority level is only attained if the same type
of report is bought from both sellers. By replicating the strategy of the ﬁrst seller, the
53second seller shares so all buyers with him and obtains a positive revenue from the sale of
information, approximately equal to half the monopolist revenue, and a positive payoﬀ from
the auction (as he can get the object at a zero price whenever he likes it and the other seller
does not like it). Any other strategy meant to attract buyers only to the second seller is
clearly less proﬁtable.
Having shown that the proﬁts of the two sellers are strictly positive it follows that,
provided c is not too high, so will be their total payoﬀ, net of c.￿
Proof of Proposition 8
If the claim does not hold there must be at least two messages m′ and m′′ such that
Pr(k = i|m′) = 1 = Pr(k = i|m′′) and Pr(q = H|m′) > 1
2 > Pr(q = H|m′′). That is, both m′
and m′′ truthfully reveals the variety of the object is i and, in addition, they reveal something
concerning the quality of the object. In this situation the owner of the good could induce
a higher bid from the Se buyers, and hence increase his proﬁts33, by always announcing m′
rather than m′′, without aﬀecting the bid of the In types, who do not care about quality.
Since the seller of information chooses always to lie when he can proﬁt by doing so, m′′ would
never be sent in equilibrium, a contradiction.
This establishes the ﬁrst part of the claim. It is then immediate to see that, if Pr(k =
i|m) = 1 for some i ∈ K and Pr(q = H|m) = 1
2, when V > 2 all Se buyers who like variety i
always bid more for the good than In buyers who like the same variety, and vice versa when
V < 2. ￿
33More precisely, the seller’s proﬁts strictly increase if Pr(q = H|m′)V > 1. When this condition does not
hold the properties of the equilibrium are the same as when Pr(q = H|m′) = Pr(q = H|m′′) = 1/2.
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